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Abstract
Democracies delegate substantial decision power to politicians. Using a
model in which an incumbent can design, examine and implement public
policies, we show that examination takes place in spite of, rather than thanks
to, elections. Elections are needed as a carrot and a stick to motivate politi-
cians, yet politicians who are overly interested in re-election shy away from
policy examination. Our analysis sheds light on the distance created in ma-
ture democracies between the political process and the production of policy
relevant information; on the role played by probing into candidates’ past; and
on the possibility of crowding out desirable political behaviour by increasing
the value of holding office.
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1 Introduction
One of the functions of elections is to provide incentives to office holders to act on
the preferences of citizens. The idea is that the threat of losing office discourages
office holders to abuse their power and encourages them to serve the public. In this
view on elections, the role of voters is simple. They should employ a voting rule
that is based on past performances. Office holders with a good record should be
rewarded with re-election, while those with a poor record should leave office.
Although the disciplining role of elections is widely acknowledged, few will main-
tain that holding elections is a perfect mechanism. An important problem is that it
is hard for voters to evaluate policy. Why? Office holders usually face complicated
problems, like unemployment, poverty, pollution, crime, and so forth. To address
those problems properly they have to take several actions: they have to design
alternative projects or programs; they must hire expertise to investigate their conse-
quences; they have to select a project or program and implement it. Ordinary voters
have only limited information about the political process. At best, voters observe
outcomes. Sometimes, they know that a government program has been launched.
Occasionally, the media reports that some program performs well or that it turns out
to be a disaster. For many programs and public projects, however, voters will not
notice the consequences, at least not before the responsible politicians can be sent
home. The reason is that it often takes considerable time before their consequences
become fully visible.
The combination of a multi-stage policy process and poorly informed voters
raises the question whether elections encourage politicians to perform all tasks, to
perform specific tasks or to perform no task at all. This is the main question our
paper addresses. We consider a situation where in each electoral term voters want
politicians to perform three tasks. The first task is the design of a project. The
second is the examination of the consequences of the project. The final task is
making the decision whether or not to undertake the project. At the end of each
electoral term, voters can re-elect the incumbent or replace him by another politician.
They observe whether or not a project is undertaken. If a project is undertaken,
voters learn the consequences of the project only with a probability. If the status
quo is maintained, voters do not know the reason for this. A dilemma results. Is the
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status quo maintained because the incumbent designed a project, examined it, and
found out that it would not improve upon the status quo? Or is it maintained as she
did not design a project in the first place? In the first place, the incumbent should
be rewarded with re-election, while in the second case she should be punished.
Our general conclusion is that policies are examined in spite of, not thanks to,
elections. Elections do stimulate the design of projects because activism on the part
of politicians is a prerequisite for re-election. The electorate resolves the dilemma
mentioned above by punishing the incumbent if the status quo is maintained, as
rewarding the status quo would amount to rewarding shirking—no project would
be designed. Here we also encounter the reason why elections do not encourage
politicians to examine policy consequences. Suppose a project is designed, examined
and it is realised its consequences are bad. Maintaining the status quo would imply
losing the elections. Why, then, would an incumbent examine a policy if basing
the implementation decision on the information obtained by doing so can only hurt
the chances of re-election? The only reason is that the incumbent cares sufficiently
about the public good. Another implication is that electoral concerns may distort
the project implementation decision. The incumbent’s desire to keep office may
induce him to undertake projects which are not in the public interest.
Although our results show limitations of holding elections as a means of guid-
ing the behaviour of politicians, we want to emphasize that we do not want claim
that democracy fails. In many democracies, agencies responsible for the collection
and provision of information operate at some distance from the political process.
This holds for agencies as the U.S. Census Bureau, the Bureau of Labor Statistics
(see Stiglitz, 1998) and the CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis
(CPB). Placing information providers at some distance can be interpreted as an
institutional response to mitigate a problem that arises from holding elections.
We also identify the conditions under which voters can induce politicians to
design projects and examine their consequences. One result is that the higher is
the probability that voters observe policy consequences, the more politicians are
encouraged to promote the public interest. Against the background that ordinary
voters have hardly incentives to acquire information about policy consequences,
this result illustrates the important role of information providers in democracies.
Information providers, like the media, opposition parties, fire alarms (McCubbins
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and Schwartz, 1984) or interest group endorsements (Lupia and McCubbins, 1994;
Grossman and Helpman, 1998) help voters to control politicians. Again the flavour
of our analysis is that democracy is much more than holding elections every four
years. For example, our results suggest that independent media are a pre-condition
for elections to function well.
This paper builds on the literature, started with Barro (1973) and further de-
veloped by Ferejohn (1986), that applies principal-agent theory to the analysis of
the relationship between politicians and voters. Besley and Case (1995) present
empirical evidence supporting the main prediction of the theoretical literature that
elections encourage elected officials to act on voters’ preferences. Analyzing the be-
haviour of U.S. governors from 1950-1986 they find that policy responds to a binding
term limit of Democrats. Persson, Roland and Tabellini (1997) use a principal-agent
model to analyze how well alternative constitutions help voters to control office hold-
ers. Though the focus of our model differs, an important similarity between their
model and ours is that the policy process consists of various stages. Coate and
Morris (1995) employ a principal-agent model to analyze whether or not lack of
information on the part of voters lead to inefficient methods of redistribution. A
similarity between their paper and ours is the emphasis on imperfect information
about policy consequences on the part of voters. Le Borgne and Lockwood (2003)
show that elections may discourage politician to act on voters’ preferences. Fol-
lowing Rogoff (1990), they distinguish between less competent and more competent
politicians. When a new politician enters office, he does not know his ability. One
way of discovering ones ability is learning by doing. The reason why elections may
encourage politicians to shirk is that the chance of losing office reduces the benefit of
learning by doing. As in Le Borgne and Lockwood, in our paper electoral concerns
may have adverse effects.
Our paper deviates from most literature on political economics in two respects.
First, in our model voters want office holders to perform multiple tasks rather than
one task. The problems voters face is therefore reminiscent to the one described in
Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) where a principal’s objective function is dependent
on various tasks an agent can perform. They compare three ways of aligning the
interest of the agent with those of the principal: the introduction of output-based
incentive pay, separation of tasks, and allocation of asset ownership. Because of the
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binary nature of our re-election rule (one is either re-elected or not), the ‘balanced’
incentive schemes described in Holmstrom and Milgrom cannot be used to motivate
incumbents. Nor is ownership a relevant solution. Separation of tasks is a possible
solution. In fact, in section 5, we argue that one can interpret some observed insti-
tutional arrangements as evidence of task separation with a view to improving the
policy process. There we also discuss what our model implies for the use of extrinsic
incentives. Second, we assume that while voters observe whether or not a project
has been implemented, they do not always observe outcomes. The implication of
the two novel aspects is that voters cannot always use a simple cut-off rule. They
also have to determine what to do if an incumbent has acted favourably in one di-
mension - a project has been designed - but it is unknown whether the incumbent
has acted properly in another dimension - whether the consequences of the project
are examined.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section presents
the model. Section 3 identifies the conditions under which voters can induce office
holders to design projects and to examine their consequences. Section 4 discusses
an extension of our model. We allow the incumbent to design and examine two
projects rather than one. We show that this extension has important implications
for our result that elections never encourage politicians to collect information about
policy consequences. Section 5 discusses main findings and implications. Proofs of
lemmas, propositions and the theorem can be found in the Appendix.
2 The Model
We consider an infinitely repeated game of incomplete information. In each period,
the players are a politician, to whom we refer as the incumbent, and the representa-
tive voter, called the voter. The assumption of a representative voter is tantamount
to the assumption that homogeneous voters coordinate on a voting strategy. We
come back to this when we discuss the voting rules. The voter derives utility from
implemented projects. His preferences are described by the following utility func-
tion:
E
∞X
t=0
δtXt (p+ µt) (1)
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where E is the expectations operator; t stands for time; 0 < δ < 1 is the discount
factor; Xt ∈ {0, 1}, with Xt = 1 denoting a new project is implemented in period
t, and Xt = 0 meaning that the status quo is maintained; p is the expected net
benefit of a project; µt is a stochastic term, uniformly distributed over [−h, h]. We
assume that h > |p|. The implication is that whether or not the voter benefits from
implementation depends on µt. By normalization, the voter does not derive utility
from the status quo. Throughout this paper, we assume that (1) not only represents
the representative voter’s preferences, but also the public interest.
The design, examination and implementation of the project is the main respon-
sibility of the incumbent. In each period t, the incumbent makes three related
decisions. Her first decision is whether to design a project, Dt = 1, or not, Dt = 0.
The cost of designing a project equals C ≥ 0. We assume that in each period the
incumbent can design at most one project. We relax this assumption in Section 4.
Suppose that a project has been designed, Dt = 1. Then the second decision the in-
cumbent makes is whether to examine the benefits of the project or not, Bt ∈ {0, 1}.
The cost of examination equals W ≥ 0. One could think of W as the time and ef-
fort the politician needs to understand the project payoff. Alternatively, W could
be viewed as the wage bill of a government department charged with the analysis
of the consequences of policies. This department is a passive player: by paying
W in period t the incumbent, but not the voter, learns µt. One of the objectives
of this paper is to show that elections do not necessarily induce the incumbent to
examine policy consequences and make informed decisions. We therefore abstract
from principal-agent problems between the department and the incumbent, as such
problems may form another reason why policy is sometimes based on an insufficient
amount of information. We assume that the costs C and W are entirely borne by
the incumbent. We come back to this assumption when we discuss the economic en-
vironment in Section 2.1. Finally, if Dt = 1, the incumbent has to decide whether or
not to implement the project. We assume that the incumbent’s strategy is time and
history independent, e.g., having been in office before does not alter the incumbent’s
current behaviour.
An incumbent j values office, cares to some extent about the public interest, and
dislikes the effort she may put in designing or examining projects. Her preferences
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are described by
E
∞X
t=0
δt
¡
djt (λ−DtC −BtW ) + θXt (p+ µt)
¢
(2)
djt is a binary variable, taking the value one if j is in office in period t and zero
otherwise. The weight θ (θ ≤ 1) represents the degree to which the incumbent
internalises the effects of project implementation on the citizenry.1 The larger θ, the
stronger the incumbent’s inclination to do good. The value λ of holding office may
include ‘ego rents’2 and vanity. We would argue that remuneration plays less of a role
in motivating a politician, given the relatively modest salary earned when compared
with the remuneration packages of executives working in the private sector. In any
event, we do not think of λ as something the voter manipulates to further his own
interests. We come back to this issue when we discuss the results of the paper. By
normalization, the incumbent derives zero utility from status quo.
To illustrate the basic idea behind the incumbent’s utility function let us discuss
two extreme cases. First suppose that λ = 0 and θ = 1. Then, apart from the
privately incurred costs, the incumbent’s interest coincides with the public interest.
The period t social welfare function equals
SWt = Xt(p+ µt)−DtC −BtW (3)
That is, we include the benefits and costs of a project, but not the utility the
incumbent obtains by being the agent who decides. Below we will assume that the
social benefits of designing a project and hiring a bureaucrat exceed the (private)
costs. We will also assume that the incumbent’s concern to do good is not sufficiently
strong to induce the incumbent to act in accordance with the public interest. An
1That a politician who is thrown out of office still derives utility from project implementation
equal to θ (p+ µt) although voters are assumed to be homogenous and the representative voter
derives p+ µt can be explained by the following example. Suppose a major bridge is constructed
connecting the southern and northern part of a country with 15 million inhabitants. The utility
of the usage of the bridge equals one util to everyone, whether one is or has been in office or
not. The total utility of the bridge therefore equals 15 million utils. Some people, however, care
about the utility the bridge has for others. If these persons happen to be in office, the degree θ to
which they internalise the utility of others influences their decisions. But it is not the case that if
everyone were to care about the utility the bridge represents for two-thirds of the population, the
total utility of the bridge would actually be 15 million × 10 million utils.
2See Persson and Tabellini (2000).
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extreme example of this would be λ > 0 and θ = 0. Then, the incumbent is not
concerned with policy outcomes per se. She is an effort-averse office seeker. The
incumbent will only design public projects or examine them if this improves her
prospects of staying in office. Arguably, λ and θ are inversely related in that people
who care more about holding office tend to care less about the intrinsic value of a
policy. There is no reason to assume, however, that λ = 1 − θ. Politicians who
seem to be equally eager to stay in office may still care to different degrees about
the public good. In what follows we therefore use the two parameters separately.
We are aware that equation (2) is a rather ad hoc representation of the incumbent’s
preferences. However, it facilitates the analysis of the question to what extent voters
must rely on concerns to do good for informed public decisions to take place.
The timing of events is as follows. The voter chooses his voting rule at the
beginning of each period t. This voting rule is a function of the information he has
at the end of the period. Then Nature draws µt. Oblivious to µt, the incumbent then
decides whether to design a project or not. If a project is designed, she can decide
to examine it, in which case µt is revealed to her. If a project has been designed
she next has to determine whether to implement the project or not. Based on what
the voter observes and following the voting rule, the incumbent stays in office or
not. An incumbent who loses office is never reappointed. Instead, an opponent j0,
identical to the incumbent, is appointed. Opponents are passive. What matters is
their availability.
At the elections, the voter knows whether a policy has been implemented or not.
The performance of an implemented policy is observed only with a certain likelihood.
Formally, if Xt = 1, then the voter observes p + µt with probability α, and does
not observe p+ µt with probability 1− α. Although the voter can observe that the
status quo has been maintained, he does not know whether the incumbent designed
a project or not. Likewise, the voter does not observe whether or not a project is
examined. All in all, our assumptions imply that voters have limited insight into
the political process, and become aware of the presence or absence of new policies
only, and possibly of their payoff. We believe that this captures well the situation
involving major policy choices like wars, infrastructural projects, and institutional
reforms. The outcomes of these policies are often hard to assess, one important
reason being that many have predominantly long-run consequences that show up
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far beyond the election period.
We follow the literature by assuming that the voter employs a retrospective
voting rule that only uses information that becomes available in the current period.3
This rule specifies whether the incumbent is reappointed (ρt = 1) or sent home
(ρt = 0) at the end of period t, given the information the voter possesses concerning
this period. As noted above, the voter in our model should be seen as representing
a large electorate of homogenous voters who co-ordinate on a voting strategy. As
a dispersed electorate would need an overwhelming amount of information to co-
ordinate on a mixed strategy — even when preferences are homogenous — in what
follows we limit ourselves to equilibria in pure strategies. Assuming heterogeneity of
preferences would reduce the incentives to design a project and therefore to collect
information on the consequences of project implemenation: as some voters would
prefer the status quo while others would value implementation, re-election becomes
less dependent both on the decision to design a policy and on the decision to gather
information. In other words, by assuming homogeneity we create a situation most
conducive to informed policy design.
A voting rule consists of three parts. The first part determines whether or not the
incumbent is re-elected if the status quo is maintained. The second part describes
whether or not the incumbent is reappointed if a project is implemented and the
voter does not observe its consequences. The third part determines what vote is cast
when the consequences of an implemented project are observed. This part identifies
a cut-off point, v. If p + µt ≥ v, the incumbent is re-elected; if p + µt < v the
incumbent is sent home. Four qualitatively different voting rules can therefore be
identified:
Rule 1: ρ =



1 if X = 1 and pt + µt ≥ v observed
0 otherwise
Rule 2: ρ =



1 if X = 1 and (i) pt + µt ≥ v observed or (ii) µt unobserved
0 otherwise
Rule 3: ρ =



1 if (i) X = 1 and pt + µt ≥ v observed, or (ii) Xt = 0
0 otherwise
3See, e.g., Persson, Roland, and Tabellini (1997).
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Rule 4: ρ =



1
if X = 1 and (i) pt + µt ≥ v observed or (ii) µt unobserved,
or if X = 0
0 otherwise
The existence of four types of voting rules illustrates the main problem the voter
faces. He wants to reward good behaviour and to punish bad behaviour, but does
not know whether Xt = 0 or Xt = 1 is the result of good or bad behaviour. What,
for example, is a voter to deduce from the observation that the status quo is main-
tained? It could mean that the incumbent did not design any project at all, an
instance of behaviour that should be punished. Voting rules 1 or 2 would then be
appropriate. If instead the status quo was maintained because the incumbent lis-
tened carefully to the advice provided to him by a bureaucrat, then the outcome
of such behaviour should be perceived as a sign of good behaviour. And re-election
should be uncontroversial, as it is with rules 3 and 4. Observe that the rule “send
home after each period” can be obtained from rule 1 by setting v = p+h. Likewise,
if v = p − h in rule 4, an incumbent remains in office no matter what. Finally, by
setting v = p+ h in rule 3, voters can reward inactive politicians and punish active
ones.
We have assumed that (i) the environment is stationary, (ii) voting rules only
use current information, and (iii) the incumbent’s strategy is time and history inde-
pendent. As a consequence, any period t equilibrium strategy is also an equilibrium
strategy in any other period. In other words, the way in which an incumbent enters
office - or the reason why she stays in office - is immaterial, both for the incum-
bent’s behaviour and for the probability of re-election. In what follows we therefore
suppress any reference to time.
2.1 The Economic Environment
We assume that from a social welfare point of view it is optimal to design a project
and have it investigated. In case a project has been designed and examined, it is
socially optimal to implement the project if and only if µt is such that p+µt ≥ 0. Let
µsoc := −p denote the socially optimal threshold value. The expected benefits of this
implementation rule for the voter equal 1
2h (h− µ
soc)
£
p+ 1
2
(h+ µsoc)
¤
= 1
4h (h+ p)
2.
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Assumption 1 From a social welfare point of view, it is optimal to design a project
and have it investigated:
W + C < 1
4h (h+ p)
2
W < 1
4h (h+ p)
2 − p
The second part ensures that once a project has been designed it is socially beneficial
to have it examined. This part is redundant if p < 0. In that case, once a project
has been designed, it is socially beneficial to have it examined: W < W + C <
1
4h (h+ p)
2 < 1
4h (h+ p)
2 − p.
For elections to matter, it should not be the case that without the threat of being
thrown out of office an incumbent politician would already ‘do good’ — men is not
governed by angels, to paraphrase James Madison. Nor should the social optimum
be attained if there is no possibility of being re-elected — men is not governed by
masochists, to paraphrase Marquis de Sade. In particular, for elections to matter
it should not be the case that without the threat of losing elections or without the
possibility of winning them a politician would (i) implement projects if and only if
it is socially beneficial; (ii) hire a bureaucrat to analyse the merits of a policy; and
(iii) design a policy. The following assumption is sufficient to guarantee that such
benevolent behaviour does not occur.
Assumption 2 Incumbents are neither angels nor masochists:
θ 1
4h (h+ p)
2 < W + C
θp < C
This assumption says that the utility the incumbent derives if expected project ben-
efits are maximal do not outweigh the joint cost of project design and examination.
The second part, relevant only if p > 0, excludes the possibility that without re-
election concerns an incumbent would design a project and implement it without
examination. It is in this sense that re-election concerns matter. Without them, no
project would be designed. These conditions put an upperbound, bθ, on the degree
to which politicians care about the common good.
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We also assume that the per period value of being in office is larger than the cost
of designing and examining a project:
Assumption 3 The per period value of holding office exceeds the costs of designing
and examining a project:
λ−W − C > 0
We now come back to our assumption that the costs of designing and evaluating the
project are entirely borne by the incumbent. With minor modifications we could
have assumed that the costs are partly borne by the incumbent — e.g., time and
effort dedicated to designing and thinking about the project — and partly by the
voter, e.g. in the form of tax. Write C = Cj + C l and W = W j +W l, where j
stands for the incumbent and l for the voter. The resulting changes to the utility
functions of the voter and the incumbent would be straightforward, and assumption
2 would have to be expressed in terms of Cj and W j. Of course, the social welfare
function and assumption 1 would stay the same. Although utility levels are affected,
splitting the costs does not change the analysis qualitatively. We therefore assume
that all costs are borne by the incumbent.
3 Analysis
In this section we analyse the extent to which the voting rules stimulate an incum-
bent politician to design a policy, examine it, and finally implement it if doing so is
socially beneficial.
As the importance the incumbent attaches to the project is not enough in itself to
design a socially beneficial project, any voting rule should create re-election concerns
that provide the incumbent with incentives to do so. Both voting rules 3 and 4 can
therefore be safely ignored as they put a premium on maintaining the status quo,
and therefore on not designing a project at all. The premium consists of assuring re-
election if the status quo is maintained, while putting re-election at risk if a project
is implemented.
Proposition 1 Under assumptions 1—3 no project will be designed if the voter uses
either rule 3 or 4.
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3.1 General Observations on Rules 1 and 2
We will now limit the analysis to voting rules 1 and 2. Both rules condition re-
election on project implementation. They differ in the exact specification of the
conditions. Whereas mere project implementation may be sufficient if the voter
uses rule 2, observation of the true payoff is a necessary condition for re-election
with rule 1. More specifically, a voter who uses rule 1 requires project payoff to
be reportedly higher than a specified threshold value for the incumbent to be re-
elected: “no news is bad news”. An electorate that uses rule 2 is happy to re-elect
the incumbent as long as she was active in the current period but the results are
unknown: “no news is good news”. If however the results are published, performance
should be sufficiently good to merit re-election. Thus, the latter rule provides an
incentive to implement a project in the hope that a project will go unobserved, an
incentive that is absent in case of rule 1.
The re-election rules differ in the possibility of ensuring that the incumbent
implements a project if and only it is socially beneficial to do so. Suppose the
electorate uses rule 1, and suppose a project has been designed and examined. If
the electorate has set v = 0, the best reply of the incumbent is to implement a
project if and only if p + µ ≥ 0. The incumbent has no interest in being more
demanding than the voters. That is, she has no interest in rejecting a project with
p + µ ≥ 0, as she would forego a profitable project without improving her chances
of being re-elected. Nor is she inclined to be more lenient than the electorate. If she
were to accept a project for which p+ µt < 0, she would both feel a loss in terms of
project payoff and be thrown out of office for sure.
Lemma 1 Suppose the electorate uses rule 1 and has set v = 0. Furthermore
suppose a project has been designed and examined. Then, a project is implemented
if and only if it is socially beneficial to do so.
As we show below, rule 2 inevitably leads to a project implementation deci-
sion that is distorted. The idea is that with re-election possible when a project is
implemented and its payoff goes unnoticed, an incumbent accepts a project even
though it is known to lead to a loss. She trades off the loss made on the project
against the value of being re-elected. Given that the policy implementation decision
is potentially optimal if rule 1 is used, we now first analyse this rule in depth.
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3.2 Further Analysis of Rule 1
This section presents the conditions under which a project is designed and examined
under rule 1. We first assume that the electorate sets v = 0, as the first best can
potentially be attained for this value of v. Recall that under rule 1, v = 0 implies
that any incumbent who designs and examines a project will choose implementation
if and only if p+ µ ≥ 0.
Suppose that a policy has been designed in period t. Consider the decision to
examine this policy or not. If the policy is examined, and the socially optimal imple-
mentation rule is used, the period t payoff equals λ−W −C+θ 1
4h (h+ p)
2. Let V ELt+1
denote the incumbent’s discounted expected value of the equilibrium continuation
game if she is re-elected. Furthermore, let V NEt+1 denote the incumbent’s discounted
expected value of the equilibrium continuation game if she is sent home. The ex-
pected payoff of designing a project, not having a bureaucrat, and implementing a
project if and only if p + µ > 0 can now be written as
λ− C −W + θ 1
4h (h+ p)
2 + α(p+ h)
2h V
EL
t+1 +
µ
1− α(p+ h)
2h
¶
V NEt+1 (4)
where αp+h
2h = αPr (p+ µ ≥ 0) is the probability that the incumbent wins an elec-
tion.
If no examination takes place, the politician still has to decide whether to imple-
ment the project or to reject it. If the conditions are such that it is optimal to reject
it if the project is not examined, then the conditions are also such that no project
should have been designed in the first place: this saves on project design costs C but
leaves the payoff otherwise unaffected. That is, the strategy of designing a project,
examining it, and maintaining the status quo cannot be part of an equilibrium.
Therefore, assume that if a project has been designed, but goes unexamined, it is
implemented. The period t payoff then equals λ− C + θp. With rule 1, examining
a project or not does not change the probability of re-election. Given that a project
has been designed, re-election depends solely on two factors outside the control of
the politician: the probability that the outcome is observed, α, and the value of µ
relative to that of v. The expected payoff of not evaluating a policy equals
λ− C + θp + α(p+ h)
2h V
EL
t+1 +
µ
1− α(p+ h)
2h
¶
V NEt+1 (5)
13
From equations (4) and (5) it follows that if
θ 1
4h (h+ p)
2 − θp ≥ W (6)
the project is examined.
Now we turn to the decision to design a policy or not. Suppose that (6) holds,
implying that if a project is designed, it is examined. Then, the relevant comparison
is between the payoff of not designing,
λ+ V NEt+1 (7)
and the payoff of designing, evaluating and implementing the project if and only if
p+ µ ≥ 0 (see equation (4)). A policy is therefore designed if
θ 1
4h (h+ p)
2 + αp+ h
2h
¡
V ELt+1 − V NEt+1
¢
≥W + C (8)
Inequalities (6) and (8) specify the conditions under which policy design, exami-
nation, and socially optimal implementation is the incumbent’s best reply to an
electorate that uses rule 1 and sets v = 0. Given this behaviour of the incumbent,
the electorate attains the first best by using rule 1 and setting v = 0. The next
proposition summarises the above results.
Proposition 2 If
θ 1
4h (h+ p)
2 − θp ≥W (9)
θ 1
4h (h+ p)
2 + αp+ h
2h
¡
V ELt+1 − V NEt+1
¢
≥W + C (10)
where
V ELt+1 − V NEt+1 =
δα (p+ h)
2h− δα(p+ h) (λ− C −W ) (11)
an equilibrium exists in which the electorate uses rule 1 and sets v∗ = 0, and the
incumbent designs and examines a project, and uses the socially optimal project
implementation rule.
Inequalities (9) and (10) give the conditions under which rule 1 yields the first-best
solution from the voter’s perspective. Conditions (10) and (11) imply that λ must
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be sufficiently high to induce the incumbent to design a project. The reason why
electoral concerns encourage project design is that re-election requires implemen-
tation of a project. Quite intuitively, the higher is α, the wider is the range of λ
for which condition (10) is satisfied. Re-election requires that voters observe that
p+ µ ≥ 0. A higher δ also widens the range for which (10) is satisfied: discounting
the future less heavily increases the value of holding office. Electoral concerns do
not affect the condition for hiring a bureaucrat. In fact, condition (9) implies that
examination requires θ to be sufficiently high. Proposition 2 therefore shows that
although electoral concerns encourage incumbents to design projects, voters have to
rely on concerns to do good for the examination of projects.
What happens if the parameter values are such that the first best cannot be
attained as a project is designed, but not examined? That is, what can the voter
do if condition (10) is met, but (9) is not?
Lemma 2 Suppose the electorate uses rule 1. Furthermore suppose that a policy
has been designed. If θ 1
4h (h+ p)
2 − θp < W , then the policy will not be examined,
irrespective of the value of v.
In other words, given the use of rule 1, if the incumbent is not sufficiently intrinsically
motivated by the public good, she cannot be induced to examine the project. The
reason is that once a project has been designed, examination does not affect election
outcomes. Suppose, for example, that µ is such that p + µ < v∗. Rule 1 implies
that the elections will be lost, independent of the decision to examine the project
or to implement it. That is, the only reason to examine a project is to know its
value so as to avoid a socially undesirable decision. Clearly, with the value of an
implemented project at its maximum if v∗ = 0, no change in v can improve the value
of examining the project.
Whether it is a bad thing that an unexamined project is implemented depends on
the alternative, maintaining the status quo. Evidently, from the voter’s perspective
it is better to maintain the status quo if p < 0. However, implementing a project
without examining it is still preferable to maintaining the status quo if p > 0.
Suppose the examination condition (9) is satisfied but the design condition (10)
fails to hold. Can a change in the threshold value v∗ ensure that a project is
designed? Note that the left-hand side of condition (10) consists of the sum of the
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value the incumbent attaches to the project payoff and the net value of being re-
elected. With the project payoff at its maximum for v = 0, any reason to change
v should stem from an improvement in the net value of re-election. An increase
in v can be discarded as it reduces both the probability of being re-elected in this
period and in any future period. Hence, we only have to consider a reduction in
v. A direct implication of v < 0 is that the implementation decision is distorted.
The reason is that the optimal cut-off value satisfies µ∗ = v∗ − p < µsoc = −p, and
so a socially undesirable project may be implemented. Note that µ∗ cannot satisfy
µ∗ < v∗ − p, since implementation of any project with µ ∈ [µ∗, v − p) is undesirable
and leads to a defeat of the next elections. Maintaining the status quo would have
been unambiguously better. Nor can µ∗ > v∗ − p be the case as this would mean
that v∗ does not affect any decision the incumbent makes, while v was meant to
induce the incumbent to design a project. Hence, in equilibrium, µ∗ = v∗ − p.
To sum up, a reduction in v increases the probability that the incumbent is re-
elected if he designs a project. This effect of v on the incumbent’s willingness to
design a project is in the right direction. Moreover, a smaller value of v implies a less
demanding voting rule and therefore increases the future value of office. This effect
is also in the right direction. On the other hand, as v < 0 distorts policy choice,
it reduces the expected social value of implemented projects. For small absolute
values of v, the cost of such a distortion is small. The larger is the absolute value of
v, the more important becomes the adverse effect of v on the expected social benefit
of designing a project. The total effect of a decrease in v on the willingness of an
incumbent to design a project is ambiguous. Only for small absolute values of v, a
decrease in v strengthens the incumbent’s incentive to design a project.
Two other considerations have to be kept in mind when v is lowered with a view
to increasing the likelihood of re-election. First, as argued above any reduction of
v makes it less likely that a bureaucrat will be hired. Second, a reduction in v may
make the project payoff negative, in which case the electorate would rather make
project design unattractive by setting v = p + h.4 This suggests that any devia-
tion from v = 0 should be the smallest needed to guarantee project design, while
4That the expected project payoff should be larger than zero is a direct consequence of our
assumption that the costs of designing and evaluating the project are not borne by the electorate.
In general, the condition is that the payoffs are larger than the costs, CL +WL, borne by the
voters.
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safeguarding project evaluation. Proposition 3 summarises the above discussion.5
Proposition 3 Suppose the electorate uses rule 1. Furthermore suppose condition
9 is satisfied, but condition 10 is not. Then, the first best cannot be attained. If
there is a v0 satisfying
θp+ h− v
0
2h
·
p+ 1
2
(h+ v0 − p)
¸
+ αp+ h− v
0
2h
¡
V ELt+1 − V NEt+1
¢
= W + C (12)
where
V ELt+1 − V NEt+1 =
δαp+h−v0
2h
1− δαp+h−v0
2h
(λ− C −W ) (13)
and if this v0 satisfies
θp+ h− v
0
2h
·
p+ 1
2
(h+ v0 − p)
¸
− θp ≥ W (14)
and
p+ h− v0
2h
·
p+ 1
2
(h+ v0 − p)
¸
≥ 0 (15)
then an equilibrium exists in which the electorate sets v∗ = v0, and the incumbent
designs and examines a policy, and implements it if and only if p+ µ > v0.
If either condition (9), (12), (14), or (15)6 is not met, the electorate cannot use rule
1 to induce the incumbent to design a project and examine it. A reason might be
that rule 1 is too demanding for it requires that voters learn that the outcomes of
the project are favourable. One problem is that voters observe outcomes only with
a probability. Indeed, the lower is α, the tighter are the conditions (10) and (12) for
project design. As will be seen, the nature of rule 2 is very different.
3.3 Rule 2
This section presents the conditions under which rule 2 induces politicians to design
and examine a project. Recall that the difference between rule 1 and 2 is that with
5Condition (12) in the proposition is a third degree polynomial in v0. The solution we are
interested in is the one with the smallest absolute value.
6Condition (15) is redundant in case p > 0, because it holds if condition (14) does (the latter
can be rewritten as p+h−v
0
2h
£
p+ 12 (h+ v0 − p)
¤
≥ p + Wθ ). Clearly, for p > 0, an equilibrium can
be sustained in which a project is designed but remains unexamined for larger distortions than are
allowed for in the equilibrium described in Proposition 3 for p > 0: it suffices to replace condition
(14) (and (15)) by p+h−v
0
2h
£
p+ 12 (h+ v0 − p)
¤
≥ p.
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rule 2 the incumbent is re-elected if the voter does not observe project outcomes,
whereas with rule 1 the incumbent is sent home in that case. We show that this
feature of rule 2 causes a distortion in the project implementation decision.
We can characterize the implementation decision by identifying the value of µ,
µ∗, for which the incumbent is indifferent between implementation and status quo.
The next lemma establishes that v∗ ≥ p + µ∗ holds in equilibrium. That is, in
equilibrium, the electorate is more demanding than the incumbent.
Lemma 3 If the electorate uses rule 2, v∗ ≥ p + µ∗ holds in equilibrium.
The intuition for this lemma is as follows. Under rule 2, the incumbent will be
re-elected if the voter does not observe project outcomes. This property of rule
2 gives the incumbent a strong incentive to implement a project. Indeed, as we
will show below, the incumbent may implement projects which hurt the voter. By
setting v > p+ µ∗ the voter decreases the benefit of re-election, thereby weakening
the incumbent’s incentive to implement socially undesirable projects.
We can now focus on those cases in which v ≥ p+µ∗. For µ = µ∗, implementation
yields a payoff equal to λ− C −W + θ (p+ µ∗) + (1− α)V ELt+1 + αV NEt+1 . If instead,
the status quo is maintained, the incumbent’s payoff equals λ − C − W + V NEt+1 .
The value of µ∗ for which the incumbent is indifferent between implementing and
maintaining the status quo equals
µ∗ = −p− (1− α)θ
¡
V ELt+1 − V NEt+1
¢
, (16)
where V ELt+1 − V NEt+1 =
δ
1− δ
£
αh−v+p
2h + (1− α)
h−µ∗
2h
¤
From (16) it directly follows that the project implementation decision is distorted
under rule 2 (as µsoc = −p). The incentive to implement the project is too strong.
The reason is that under rule 2 implementation of a socially undesirable project may
lead to re-election. By manipulating v, the electorate can influence the extent to
which a distortionary decision is taken. An increase in v reduces the value of winning
the elections and therefore the advantage of implementation in terms of continuation
value. Hence, with a view to minimizing the distortion associated with the project
implementation decision, the policy maker should set v as high as possible.
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Lemma 4 If the electorate uses rule 2, the smallest possible distortion at the policy
implementation stage can potentially be assured by setting v = p+ h.
The next step is to check under which conditions politicians in fact design and
examine a project in equilibrium given v = p+ h.
Suppose that the incumbent has designed a project. Furthermore suppose that
there is a value of µ∗ ∈ (−h, h) that solves equation (16) for v = p+ h. Evaluating
a project then yields a payoff to the incumbent equal to
λ− C −W + θh− µ
∗
2h
·
p+ 1
2
(h+ µ∗)
¸
+
(1− α) h− µ
∗
2h V
EL
t+1 +
µ
1− (1− α) h− µ
∗
2h
¶
V NEt+1 (17)
If the project remains unexamined it will be implemented in equilibrium (as not
implementing it cannot be part of an equilibrium in which a costly project is de-
signed). This yields a payoff equal to λ−C + θp+ (1− α)V ELt+1 + αV NEt+1 . It follows
that a policy is examined if and only if
θh− µ
∗
2h
·
p+ 1
2
(h+ µ∗)
¸
− θp− (1− α) h+ µ
∗
2h δ
¡
V ELt+1 − V NEt+1
¢
≥W (18)
Equation (18) shows that electoral concerns weaken the incentive to examine a policy
if the electorate uses rule 2 and sets v = p+h. That is, the more the incumbent cares
about holding office, the less inclined she is to examine the project. The intuition
is as follows. If a policy is examined in equilibrium, the information made available
about its quality will be used. Hence, with some probability a policy will be found
unworthy of pursuing, and instead the status quo will be maintained. The upcoming
elections will be lost for sure. If instead the incumbent decides to remain ignorant
as to the quality of her designed policy and implements it without any examination,
there is a chance that its payoff goes unnoticed even if it is a bad policy and would
have been rejected had examination taken place. In other words, if the electorate
uses rule 2 the chances of re-election grow dimmer due to examination.
Now consider the incumbent’s decision on project design. If a policy is designed,
examined, and implemented using µ∗, the expected utility for the incumbent equals
the expression in (17). If instead no policy is designed, the expected utility amounts
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to λ+ V NEt+1 . A policy will thus be designed if and only if
θh− µ
∗
2h
·
p+ 1
2
(h+ µ∗)
¸
+
h− µ∗
2h (1− α)
¡
V ELt+1 − V NEt+1
¢
≥ W + C (19)
If conditions (18) and (19) hold, policy design, examination, and implementation
if and only if µt ≥ µ∗ is a best reply to an electorate that uses rule 2 and has set
v = p + h. Given that a policy is designed and examined, and that rule 2 is used,
the best the electorate can do is to set v = p+ h. The next proposition summarises
the above.7’8
Proposition 4 Suppose the electorate uses rule 2. Let µ∗ satisfy
µ∗ = −p− 1− αθ
¡
V ELt+1 − V NEt+1
¢
(20)
with
V ELt+1 − V NEt+1 =
δ (1− α) h−µ∗
2h
1− δ
£
(1− α) h−µ∗
2h
¤ (λ− C −W ) (21)
and assume µ∗ ∈ (−h, h). If
θh− µ
∗
2h
·
p+ 1
2
(h+ µ∗)
¸
− θp− (1− α) h+ µ
∗
2h
¡
V ELt+1 − V NEt+1
¢
≥ W , (22)
θh− µ
∗
2h
·
p+ 1
2
(h+ µ∗)
¸
+ (1− α) h− µ
∗
2h
¡
V ELt+1 − V NEt+1
¢
≥ W + C (23)
and
h− µ∗
2h
·
p+ 1
2
(h+ µ∗)
¸
≥ 0 (24)
hold, an equilibrium exists in which (i) the incumbent designs and examines a project,
and implements it if and only if µt ≥ µ∗, and (ii) the electorate sets v∗ = p+ h.
Proposition 4 gives the conditions under which under rule 2 projects are designed
and examined. Let us now examine how those conditions depend on the parameters
of the model. First consider α, the probability with which the payoff of the project
is revealed. If α decreases, the threshold value µ∗ goes down, and the distortion
7Equations (20) and (26) specify a third degree polynomial in µ∗. We are interested in the
solution closest to −p.
8Observe that if condition (22) holds, then so does (24) when p > 0.
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at the project implementation stage grows. As a result, the expected value of an
implemented project declines. Condition (23) governing whether a project will be
designed or not can be rewritten using the expression for the optimal threshold
value, equation (20), as
θ (h− µ
∗)2
4h ≥W + C (25)
It is not hard to see that a lower value of α enlarges the parameter set for which
a project will be designed.9 However, if it becomes less likely that the electorate
observes the project outcome before the next elections, it becomes less likely that the
incumbent will examine the project. As noted, the project payoff declines, making
project examination less beneficial. Moreover, in any period the chances of being re-
elected are strengthened, implying that the difference in value of being re-elected or
not increases. The result is that a reduction in α leads to a smaller set of parameters
for which a project is examined. Of course, condition (24) guarantees that too large
a distortion, or uninformed implementation, cannot be part of an equilibrium. The
electorate can always ensure the status quo, by using rule 1, with v = p+ h. In this
way, it can avoid a loss on implemented projects.
A comparable negative effect results from an increase in the value attached to
holding office, λ, or, equivalently, a reduction in time discounting, δ. Any increase
in the value attached to being in office leads to a larger distortion, see equations (20)
and (21). As a consequence, the range of parameters for which a policy is examined
shrinks (as the project payoff declines, and the importance of being re-elected grows,
see equation (22)). At the same the inclination to design a project is stimulated, as
can be deduced from equation (25).
The upshot of this discussion is that the structure of rule 2 is such that any
change in the environment that makes re-election more probable or more profitable
reduces the range of parameters for which a project is examined, but widens the
range for which it is designed.
What happens if either condition (22) or (23) is violated? First suppose that
a project is designed, but not examined, i.e., (23) holds, but (22) does not. If the
incumbent is unwilling to examine a project for v = p+ h, then, within the bounds
set by the structure of rule 2, the electorate is left without any means to strengthen
9Observe that ∂θ
(h−µ∗)2
4h
∂α = −
2(h−µ∗)
4h
∂µ∗
∂α < 0.
21
the incumbent’s incentive to take an informed decision. Any reduction of v below
p+ h leads to a larger distortion, because the incumbent becomes more tempted to
implement a project in the hope its payoff is not revealed: both the probability of
re-election and the discounted value of being re-elected go up. Hence, the expected
value of an implemented project goes down. Moreover, as explained above, the
probability of re-election is always smaller if a project is implemented with rather
than without examination. The net effect is that if (22) is violated for v = p + h,
it is violated for any other value of v as any decline in v raises the likelihood and
value of being re-elected.
This brings us to one of the main results of this paper. Whether the electorate
uses re-election rule 1 or rule 2, any incentives to examine a policy stem from an
intrinsic interest in the public good, not from a concern with re-election. In other
words, policies are examined in spite of, not thanks to elections.
Theorem 1 If an incumbent can only design and examine one project in her term,
elections do not give the incumbent any incentives to examine decisions.
A corollary of this result is that
Corollary 2 A politician who does not care about the public good, θ = 0, can not be
motivated to take informed decisions, however much she cares about holding office.
This in turn implies that even if the cost of information about the quality of the
project were to be reduced or indeed if the relevant information were offered for
free, W = 0, an incumbent who only cares about re-appointment would not want
to examine the project.
Corollary 3 An incumbent who does not care about the public good, θ = 0, cannot
be motivated to examine the project by any reduction in the cost of examination W .
Now let us assume that condition 22 is met, but that the threshold value v =
p + h is too large for a project to be designed, i.e., condition 23 does not hold.
In this situation, the electorate may stimulate the incumbent to design a project
by lowering the threshold value, making re-election more likely. This comes at the
cost of reducing the expected value of implemented projects. As a consequence,
the range of parameters for which the project will be examined shrinks. Moreover,
22
the electorate loses any interest in reducing v if and if the project payoff becomes
negative. Finally, the reduction in project payoff may offset the increased value of
re-election. Therefore, the electorate will set v as high as possible such that a project
is designed and examined, and such that project payoff is non-negative.
Proposition 5 Suppose the electorate uses rule 2, and suppose condition (23) is
violated, but condition (22) is not. Suppose there is a v∗ ∈ (−h, h) and a µ∗ (v∗) ∈
(−h, h) that jointly satisfy
θh− µ
∗ (v∗))
2h
·
p + 1
2
(h+ µ∗ (v∗))
¸
+
(1− α) (v∗ − [p+ µ∗ (v∗)]) + p+ h− v∗
2h
¡
V ELt+1 − V NEt+1
¢
= W + C (26)
with
V ELt+1 − V NEt+1 =
δ [(1− α) (v∗ − [p+ µ∗ (v∗)]) + p+ h− v∗]
2h− δ [(1− α) (v∗ − [p + µ∗ (v∗)]) + p+ h− v∗] (λ− C −W ) (27)
and
θ (p+ µ∗ (v∗)) = − (1− α)
¡
V ELt+1 − V NEt+1
¢
(28)
If
θh− µ
∗ (v∗))
2h
·
p+ 1
2
(h+ µ∗ (v∗))
¸
− θp− (h+ µ
∗ (v∗)) (1− α)
2h
¡
V ELt+1 − V NEt+1
¢
≥W
(29)
and
θh− µ
∗ (v∗))
2h
·
p+ 1
2
(h+ µ∗ (v∗))
¸
≥ 0 (30)
hold, an equilibrium exists in which (i) the incumbent designs and examines a project,
and implements it if and only if µ > µ∗ (v∗), and (ii) the electorate sets v = v∗.
Clearly, if there is no value for v∗ or for µ∗ (v∗) in the interval (−h, h), then this
equilibrium does not exist. If either condition (22), (26), (29), or (30) is not met,
rule 2 cannot be used to induce the incumbent to design and examine a project. One
major possible reason is either too low or too high a probability that the project
payoff is revealed. In the first case, although a project would be designed, it would
not be examined. In the latter case, no project would be designed.
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4 Extension
An important result of the previous section is that electoral concerns discourage
incumbents to examine a project. We have discussed two reasons for this result.
First, electoral concerns may distort project choice, and thereby reduce the value
of information about the the consequences of the project. Second, examination of
a project increases the probability of status quo, and status quo never leads to re-
election. In this section we argue that there is a countervailing force. In a situation
where the incumbent can design more than one project, examining a project could
be in the interest of an incumbent because a bureaucrat can prevent the incumbent
from implementing a project that leads to losing office.
To illustrate this countervailing force, we extend the model of the previous section
by giving the incumbent the opportunity to design two projects. More specifically,
we split up each period t into two parts, (t, 1) and (t, 2). In each part k the incumbent
can design one project, Dt,k ∈ {0, 1} with p + µt,k, and examine it, Bt,k ∈ {0, 1}.
We maintain the assumption that the incumbent can implement only one project
(if Xt,1 = 1, then Xt,2 = 0). One could think of a policy reform. Only one reform
is possible. If, as a result of examining it, a proposal for a reform is found to lead
to disappointing results, the incumbent can choose to design another one. The
costs of designing a project, C, and examining it, W , are the same for (t, 1) and
(t, 2). To show most convincingly that it is electoral concerns that may encourage
an incumbent to examine a project, we assume that incumbents do not care about
the public interest. Recall that under such circumstances, an incumbent would not
examine a project if he could only design one project. We focus on voting rule
1. Re-election thus requires implementation of a project and that project payoffs
exceed the threshold v.
4.1 Analysis
We first analyze the second part of the incumbent’s term. We identify the condition
under which the incumbent designs a project in the second part of her term and
argue that the incumbent never examines a project in the second part of his term.
Suppose that in the first part of her term, an incumbent designed a project, hired a
bureaucrat, but did not implement a project, because it would not lead to re-election.
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Then, in the second part of his term, this incumbent has his last chance of designing
a project that may please voters. Suppose that Dt,2 = 1. Clearly, in the second
part of his term, the incumbent has no incentive to hire a bureaucrat. The reason is
that the incumbent is not concerned with the public interest. Moreover, examining
the consequences of the project does not affect his chances of re-election. So, if the
incumbent designs a project in part two of his term, Dt,2 = 1, he will implement
it without further ado. Now consider the incumbent’s decision whether or not to
design a project. If Dt,2 = 0, the payoff to the incumbent equals λ − C −W .10 If
Dt,2 = 1, his payoff equals λ − 2C −W + αp+h−v2h V ELt+1 . The incumbent therefore
chooses Dt,2 = 1 if
αp+ h− v
2h V
EL
t+1 > C (31)
Equation (31) shows that if the discounted value of re-election is sufficiently high,
the incumbent will design a project in the second part of his term.
Let us now consider the first part of the incumbent’s term. Suppose that (31)
holds. Furthermore suppose that in the first part of his term, the incumbent has
designed a project, Dt,1 = 1, and has hired a bureaucrat, Bt,1 = 1. Clearly, given
the voting rule, it is only in the interest of the incumbent to implement the project
if p + µt,1 ≥ v. If p + µt,1 < v, then implementation would lead to a certain defeat
in the next election. Now consider the incumbent’s decision whether or not to
examine the project, Bt,1. When he does not hire a bureaucrat, Xt,1 = 1 yields
λ− C + αp+h−v
2h δV ELt+1 . If Bt,1 = 1, the incumbent’s expected payoff equals
λ− C −W + αp+ h− v
2h δV
EL
t+1 +
v − (p− h)
2h
·
αp+ h− v
2h δV
EL
t+1 − C
¸
(32)
The second term of (32) gives the probability that the project designed in the first
part of an electoral term leads to re-election multiplied by the equilibrium continua-
tion value for the incumbent if he is reappointed. The third term gives the expected
payoff to the incumbent if it turns out that Xt,1 does not satisfy the voter. This
term represents the benefit of a bureaucrat from the incumbent’s point of view. The
bureaucrat shows the incumbent whether or not the first project is good enough. If
not, another project should be designed. Hence, hiring a bureaucrat yields a higher
10Notice that V NEt+1 = 0. The reason is that the incumbent only values office. Moreover, with
infinite citizens, the incumbent’s share in the public interest is negligible.
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payoff than not hiring if
1
2h (v − (p− h))
·
α
(p+ h− v)δV ELt+1
2h − C
¸
> W (33)
Notice that if condition (33) holds, then conditions (31) holds too.
Now consider the decision whether or not to design a project. Not design-
ing a project in the first part of her term gives the incumbent a payoff equal to
α (p+h−v)δV
EL
t+1
2h + λ − C. If Xt,1 = 1, then his payoff is equal to (32). Hence, the
condition for designing a project is the same as the condition for hiring a bureau-
crat. To sum up, given that the voter uses rule 1 and has set the threshold v, and
assuming that condition (33) holds, the incumbent’s best reply is as follows: she
designs and examines a project in the first part of her term, and implements it if
µt,1 satisfies p + µt,1 > v. If instead p + µt,1 ≤ v, then she designs a second project
and implements it without consulting a bureaucrat.
Let us now determine the optimal value of v, supposing that condition (33) is
satisfied. The value of v directly affects the project implementation decision. Given
that an incumbent chooses Xt,1 = 1 iff p+ µt,1 > v and chooses Xt,2 = 1 otherwise,
the expected period t payoff to the voter equals
(p+ h− v)
2h
·
p+ 1
2
(h+ v − p)
¸
+
(v − (p− h)) p
2h (34)
The first term of (34) is related to the first part of an incumbent’s term. With
probability 1
2h(p+ h− v) the incumbent designs a project for which p+ µ > v. The
term in square brackets gives the expected payoff to the agent for a project with
p+ µ > v. The second part of (34) is related to the second part of the incumbent’s
term. It gives the expected payoff to the voter if Xt,2 = 1. Provided that (33)
is satisfied, the voter chooses that value of v that maximizes (34). Simple algebra
shows that (34) is maximized at v∗ = p, implying that µ∗ = 0. This implies that
a project is implemented in the first part of the term with probability 1
2
, and that
the expected value of a project implemented equals p + 1
4
h.11 To understand the
fact that v∗ = p, first recall that if in the first part of the incumbent’s term no
11Obviously, the expected value created is larger than the value of an implemented project that
remains unexamined, p. If p + 14h < 0, the voter does not want the incumbent to implement a
project. This can be assured by setting v = p+ h.
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project is implemented, then another one will be implemented in the second part.
Since the latter project will not be screened by a bureaucrat, that project yields an
expected payoff to the voter equal to p. By setting v∗ = p the voter is certain that
the incumbent only implements a project in the first part of his term if that project
delivers a higher payoff than the expected payoff of a project that is not screened.
The following proposition summarizes the above discussion.
Proposition 6 Suppose the incumbent only values office, θ = 0, λ > 0. Suppose
the electorate uses rule 1, and that the incumbent can design a project twice. Assume
p+ 1
4
h > 0, and assume 1
2
£
α 1
2
V ELt+1 − C
¤
≥W . Then, an equilibrium exist in which
(i) the voter sets v∗ = p, and (ii) the incumbent designs and examines a project in
the first part of her term, and implements it if µt,1 satisfies p + µt,1 ≥ 0. If instead
p + µt,1 < 0, the project is not implemented in the first part of her term. Instead,
she designs a second project and implements it without consulting a bureaucrat.
In the light of our earlier findings, the most important result of this section is that
electoral concerns may to some extent encourage an incumbent to collect informa-
tion. “To some extent”, as electoral concerns do not stimulate an incumbent to
aquire information at the end of her term. Clearly, this result remains if we assume
that she can design n projects rather than 2: electoral concerns do not induce her
to collect information at the last part of her term.
Another result from the above analysis is that, as an incumbent does not collect
information in the second part of her term, the implementation decision is inevitably
distorted. Too many projects are undertaken. Our assumption that the incumbent
is not concerned with the public interest aggravates the distortion. If the incumbent
also cares about the public good, she may decide to collect information in the second
part of her term. This would reduce, but not offset, the distortion.
5 Discussion
Democracies delegate substantial decision power to politicians. The electorate would
like good public decisions to rely on insight rather than luck. Our analysis shows the
challenge an electorate faces in assuring this is actually the case. It shows that in-
formed political decision making requires a sufficient degree of intrinsic motivation.
27
Valuing office, and hence valuing re-election, may be an obstacle to policy examina-
tion. A tension results. By assumption, elections are needed as a carrot and a stick
to motivate politicians. Yet politicians who are overly interested in re-election shy
away from policy examination.
This tension stems from the fact that examination, and basing the implemen-
tation decision on the information obtained, improves the value of implemented
policies rather than the chances of re-election. Under rule 1, examination leaves the
probability of re-election unaffected. Hence, politicians who identify little with the
public good will not examine a project. Under rule 2, examination reduces the like-
lihood of re-election as drawing a project that falls short of the standard set by the
incumbent now leads to losing office, while without examination the project would
have been implemented and re-election would have been possible. Thus, politicians
who are hardly intrinsically motivated or care substantially about holding office do
not examine projects.
Under rule 2, then, the likelihood of observing the payoff of implemented projects
plays an important role when it comes to policy examination. The more likely it
becomes that the project payoff is revealed (α), the larger is the set of parameters
for which a project will be examined. Conditional on a project being designed and
examined, any increase in α reduces the distortion at the project implementation
stage. This suggests that it is in the interest of the citizenry to improve the likelihood
of observation. A high general level of education is likely to stimulate a better insight
into the way a specific policy measure will impact voters’ lives. Similarly, closer
media attention, especially of an investigative kind, ameliorates the possibilities
of controlling political delegates through elections.12 However, the inclination to
design a project is reduced by enhanced observability of the policy implications.
Hence, our model suggests that whether or not improvements in the observability
of policy outcomes remedy a shortcoming in the political process depends on the
circumstances that bring about the failing in the first place.
We find that policies are examined in spite of elections. Yet some of our assump-
tions create a world in which the inclination to examine policies thanks to elections
should be strongest. In other words, alternative assumptions would further reduce
12This will also make project design more likely under rule 1, as observing the payoff of an
implemented project with too low a frequency may hinder project design.
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the tendency to examine policies. First, we assume the electorate to be both homo-
geneous and able to coordinate on a re-election rule. A heterogeneous electorate,
or one that is unable to coordinate on a specific rule, would make re-election less
dependent on the actual implementation of a policy as some voters would prefer
maintaining the status quo. Policy examination would become less profitable.13 We
also assume that incumbents, opponents, and the electorate agree on what is the
socially desirable implementation rule. There is therefore no problem of aggregation
of preferences. Third, it is assumed that principal-agent problems do not hamper
the relationship between the incumbent and bureaucrat, nor that the incumbent
and the bureaucrat differ in their views as to what constitutes a socially desirable
policy. Once again, a deviation from this assumption could make examination more
problematic. Finally, we assume that the incumbent deals with one societal prob-
lem in her term, and that the electorate bases her verdict on how well she addresses
this problem. It is not uncommon to identify a president or government with one
major issue, think of Reagonomics and Thatcherism, or Roosevelt’s New Deal. The
overarching political strategy and the general political stance rather than specific
individual decisions may then rule the likelihood of re-election. In other cases, the
probability of re-election depends on the way the politician addresses a variety of
issues. With more than one problem to be addressed, the possible lack of observa-
tion of the results in one area may reduce the incentive to examine policy proposals
in another as re-election has become unlikely anyway. Alternatively, the electorate
may decide to become less demanding. In any event, the inclination to examine any
single project would shrink.
Information plays a key role in our understanding of a representative democracy.
This paper highlights that delegation of decision authority in a democracy does not
by itself lead to the production and use of relevant information by the delegates.
Sometimes an institutional change may suffice to improve the alignment of the
incumbent with the electorate. For example, if a project is designed, but the in-
cumbent has no incentive to examine it, one of the means open to the electorate
is a lengthening of the term the incumbent stays in office. This was discussed in
13By assuming that the electorate is both homogeneous and able to coordinate on a voting rule
we follow the literature, see Ferejohn (1986) and Persson, Roland, and Tabellini (1997). Note,
however, that relaxing this assumption would reduce the beneficial effect elections have in their
papers.
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section 4. A project may now be examined, but it comes at the cost of an inevitably
distorted implementation decision. Also, any model that allows for the possibility
of rent extraction by an incumbent will show that a longer term worsens this moral
hazard problem, see e.g. Ferejohn (1986).
If the electorate uses rule 1, an incumbent who cares about the public good, but
too little to examine policies herself, would pay heed to an unfavourable advice of
an independent institution. In this sense, the existence of organizations that both
collect information and provide analysis and that operate at some distance from the
political process can be seen as an institutional arrangement meant to fill the gap
left uncovered by holding elections.14 Many of such organizations exist. They view
their proclaimed independence as their principal defining characteristic, especially
those that receive some public funding or were set up with governmental aid.15 The
Irish Economic and Social Research Institute, ESRI, for instance, having explained
that it receives a grant-in-aid from the Department of Finance writes in bold on its
webpage “The ESRI is not a semi-state agency and the Government plays no legal
role in appointing the Council or Executive”. It is also made clear that when the
Institute was founded in 1960, a decision in which the Secretary of the Department
of Finance played a significant role, “it was considered desirable that this research be
done outside the civil service in a setting free from government or political influence”.
That the government is represented in the Institute can, however, not be denied:
“In practice it is usual for a senior official of the Department of Finance to be elected
to serve on the Executive”.16
Apart from being a crucial input in the public decision process, information
about political decisions and outcomes is the key ingredient for elections to perform
their controlling function. We have depicted this information as if it ‘appears’,
by an act of Nature, at an exogenous rate. Clearly, in reality some information
appears without the conscious intervention of a human, although the likelihood may
14Our model predicts that if a politician does not care about the public good, she would still
ignore this information, even if it were provided for free, or equivalently if it its costs were sunk
because incurred as a matter of convention rather than discretion. In reality, ignoring existing
information and reports may pose a serious threat to a politician’s credibility if it is found out that
what was ignored was relevant to the issue at hand.
15See for example the homepages of the economic research and policy analysis organizations
united in Euroframe (www.euro-frame.org) or in Enepri (www.enepri.org).
16The ESRI website is www.esri.ie.
30
still be influenced by human action. Think of information about the quality of
some decisions taken by the ministry of Transport as signalled by rush hour traffic
congestion. However, within the realm of politics, it seems that an important part
of information is more likely to be both consciously produced and revealed. Does
this improve the functioning of a democracy? Does it depend on the voting rule the
electorate uses? These are very much open questions about which we make some
tentative comments by way of conclusion.
If information is endogenous, the intentions of the politician take centre stage.
She may want to diffuse true or fabricated information that is favourable to her
position, and, similarly, consciously hide information that would be detrimental to
her chances of re-election.17 If information revelation is a prerequisite for re-election,
as is the case under rule 1, politicians are tempted to produce information. The
credibility of this information becomes a serious issue. Quality media may serve as
a screening device, and the presence of opposition parties and interest groups helps.
But we would also suggest that governmental auditing offices serve as ‘certifying
institutions’ of the statements politicians make regarding the success of important
policy measures. The scope of various such offices, like the United States General
Accounting Office, GAO, and the Netherlands Court of Audit (Rekenkamer), has
gradually broadened over time. Initially, these courts carried out audits. Today,
they also evaluate the performance of programmes. They try to determine whether
or not policies have had the intended effects. The reports they publish will only
be credible if the executive branch can commit not to interfere with their analysis
and publications. They should therefore operate independently of the executive.
Such is in fact often the case: the GAO, for instance, is the “audit, evaluation,
and investigative arm of Congress", not of the president;18 and both the German
Bundesrechnungshof and the Dutch Rekenkamer are subject only to the law.
An incumbent is even less interested in publication of information about the
quality of her decisions when a ‘no news is good news’ re-election rule is used. Under
such a rule, revealing information may reduce the incumbent’s chances of re-election,
17One way in which individual politicians or political parties may influence the provision of
information is by owning the media. Djankov et al. (2001) find empirical evidence that government
ownership of the media is associated with inferior economic and social outcomes. See Besley and
Prat (2002) for a model of collusion between government and media.
18See www.gao.gov.
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making it more likely that pertinent information is ignored, obfuscated or put in the
‘doofpot’19. With this re-election rule, freedom of press is essential, as is the freedom
to investigate the performance of public policies. The Dutch Rekenkamer, e.g., is
able to decide for itself “what to audit, how to do so, and what to publish”.20
If an incumbent may consciously produce and hide policy relevant information,
verifying her intentions forms an important goal of elections. Can a candidate be
trusted, can she be relied on? It is in the electorate’s interest to stimulate an interest
in the public good, if it wants policies to be examined. We would tentatively suggest
that it is easier to instill a sense of civic virtue and identification with the public
the more united this public is. It may well be harder to find potential politicians
with an interest in the public good in a society that for a long time has thought
along tribal lines like Iraq than in a society that has had a strong national tradition
and identity as, say, France. Also, the more a society is focused on individualism
and material well being, the harder it will be to stimulate an identification with the
public good.
The emphasis put by certain political candidates during their election campaigns
on personal integrity rather than their views on actual policy problems can be in-
terpreted very much along the same lines. If one can convince the electorate to be
willing to abstain from personal pleasure (“I didn’t inhale”) to remain a reputable
and trustworthy person, with values aligned with those of the majority of one’s
potential voters, then voters may well believe that in actual matters of policy the
candidate will decide once again in accordance with their interests. Clearly, elec-
tions perform a screening function, with voters selecting candidates on the basis of
any characteristics the former deem relevant. This aspect was left undiscussed in
our model. Selecting the candidate who identifies most with the public good makes
project examination more likely. Probing into a candidate’s past by her opponents
and the media is a consequence of the desire to establish a candidate’s civic virtue or
lack of it. Given the determining role played by the identification with the common
19The doofpot is an ‘extinguisher’, a pot that was traditionally kept next to fireplaces to put
hot coals in and extinguish them. Ethel Portnoy, the author, explains this word as follows: “As
for real [Dutch] scandals, I’ve seen them being hushed up time and again. The Dutch even have
a phrase for this kind of process - putting the affair in the doofpot, the way one pushes a fire-
brand into a barrel of sand. They use this phrase a lot, for they seem to need it frequently”
(http://www.nrc.nl/W2/Lab/Profiel/Netherlands2000/behaviour.html).
20See www.rekenkamer.nl.
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good in the decision whether to examine a policy or not, this scrutiny, often frowned
upon by the educated citizen, may well serve an important purpose.
Can raising the value of holding office, λ, with a view to attracting better candi-
dates, replace probing for trust? Changing λ has ambiguous effects that depend on
the voting rule used. Increased ego rents, bigger palaces, more media attention etc.
improve the likelihood that a project is designed when the electorate uses the first
voting convention. If it is the case that λ and θ are inversely related, an increase
in λ may cause problems as it will reduce the weight attached to the public good.
The larger price incentive will then also reduce the range of parameters for which a
policy is examined. Under the second rule, an increase in λ leads to a larger distor-
tion, puts project examination at risk, while making project design more attractive.
Indeed, if the electorate uses the second convention, extrinsic motivation (price in-
centives) may crowd out intrinsic motivation (public spirit), even in the absence of
an inverse relationship between λ and θ.21 Suppose p > 0, and that the parameters
are such that an equilibrium exists in which a project is designed and examined, i.e.,
conditions (20)-(24) are satisfied. If λ goes up as the result of say a higher salary,
it may be the case that a project is no longer examined, implying that the project
payoff has gone down. In other words, before the increase in λ the incumbent was
sufficiently interested in the public good to induce her to examine the project. The
increase in salary has eliminated these good intentions.
21Terminology borrowed from Frey, Oberholzer-Gee, and Eichenberger (1996).
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Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1: Immediate.
Proof of Lemma 1: This was shown in the text above the Lemma.
Proof of Proposition 2: The proof was provided in the text leading up to the
presentation of the proposition. That V ELt+1 − V NEt+1 = δ1−δαh+p
2h
(λ− C −W ) follows
from the strategy followed by future incumbents and the voter. In any period, each
incumbent and the voter face the same problem as in period t. Hence, strategies
which are optimal in period t are also optimal in period t+ i. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2: This is shown in the text directly following the lemma.Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3: From the analysis in the text we know that if the first
best cannot be obtained because no project is designed, the only solution available
is to let v∗ < 0. In the text we have shown that in equilibrium µ∗t = v∗ − p.
Suppose a project has been designed and consider the incumbent’s decision
whether or not to examine it. If the project is examined, the payoff to the in-
cumbent equals
λ−W − C + θp+ h− v
∗
2h
·
p+ 1
2
(v∗ − p+ h)
¸
(A.1)
+αp+ h− v
∗
2h V
EL
t+1 +
µ
1− αp+ h− v
∗
2h
¶
V NEt+1
If the project remains unexamined it will be implemented (as not implementing it
cannot be part of an equilibrium in which a costly project is designed), yielding a
payoff of
λ− C + θp+ αp+ h− v
∗
2h V
EL
t+1 +
µ
1− αp+ h− v
∗
2h
¶
V NEt+1 (A.2)
Therefore, the project will be examined if and only if
θp+ h− v
∗
2h
·
p+ 1
2
(v∗ − p+ h)
¸
− θp ≥W (A.3)
If no project is designed, the incumbent’s payoff equals λ + V NEt+1 . Now suppose
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equation (A.3) holds. Then, a project will be designed if and only if
θp+ h− v
∗
2h
·
p+ 1
2
(v∗ − p+ h)
¸
+ αp+ h− v
∗
2h
¡
V ELt+1 − V NEt+1
¢
≥W + C (A.4)
with
V ELt+1 − V NEt+1 =
δ
1− δαp+h−v∗
2h
(λ− C −W ) (A.5)
Finally consider the strategy of the voter. His best reply is to set v∗ as close to
zero as possible subject to the constraint that he just induces the incumbent to
design a project, and subject to the constraints that (a) the project is examined
and (b) project payoff is positive. By setting v∗ in this way, he distorts project
implementation as little as possible. Therefore, he sets v∗ such that equation (A.4)
holds with equality. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 3: We first show that given that a project has been designed
and examined, p+ µ∗ < 0 holds. Suppose v > p+ µ∗. At µ = µ∗, the incumbent is
indifferent between Xt = 1 and Xt = 0. For µ = µ∗ and Xt = 1, the incumbent’s
payoff equals
λ− C −W + θ (p+ µ∗) + (1− α)V ELt+1 + αV NEt+1 (A.6)
For µ = µ∗ and Xt = 0, the incumbent’s payoff equals
λ− C −W + V NEt+1 (A.7)
Equating (A.6) and (A.7) and solving for µ∗ yields
µ∗ = −p− 1− αθ
¡
V ELt+1 − V NEt+1
¢
(A.8)
with V ELt+1 − V NEt+1 =
δ
1− δ
£
αh−v+p
2h + (1− α)
h−µ∗
2h
¤ (λ− C −W )
Since V ELt+1 − V NEt+1 > 0, p + µ∗ < 0. Now suppose v ≤ p + µ∗. Then for µ = µ∗ and
Xt = 1, the incumbent’s payoff equals
λ− C −W + θ (p+ µ∗) + V ELt+1
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For µ = µ∗ and Xt = 0, the incumbent’s payoff equals
λ− C −W + V NEt+1
so that
µ∗ = −p− 1θ
¡
V ELt+1 − V NEt+1
¢
(A.9)
with V ELt+1 − V NEt+1 =
δ
1− δ h−µ∗
2h
(λ− C −W )
Again, since V ELt+1 − V NEt+1 > 0, p + µ∗ < 0. Hence, we have shown that given that
a project has been designed and examined, p + µ∗ < 0. Now, we will argue that
given project design and examination, in equilibrium we have v∗ ≥ p + µ∗. Our
finding that p + µ∗ < 0 implies that, from the electorate’s perspective, incumbents
chooses Xt = 1 too often. If v = p + µ∗, (A.9) reduces to (A.8). For v ≥ p + µ∗,
(A.8) implies that µ∗ increases with v, while (A.9) implies that for v < p + µ∗,
µ∗ is independent of v. Hence, in the latter case the electorate cannot reduce the
distortion in the implementation decision as v has no influence neither on the value of
the continuation game, nor on the value of implemented projects. As a consequence,
neither the decision to examine nor to design would be altered by increasing v as
long as v < p + µ∗ holds. With v ≥ p + µ∗, an increase in v starts to influence
the incumbent’s decisions; in particular, the distortion at the implementation stage
shrinks. Hence, in equilibrium, v∗ ≥ p+ µ∗. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 4: It follows from the proof of lemma 3 that a higher value of v
reduces the distortion at the implementation stage. Hence, if a project is designed
and examined, the smallest distortion is attained when v = p+ h. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4: Suppose the electorate has set v = p + h. Hence, from
lemma 3 we know that µ∗ is as reported in (A.8). Consider the incumbent’s decision
to examine a project or not, given that a project has been designed. As in the proof of
Proposition 2, the relevant comparison is between examining a project and optimal
project implementation on the one hand, and not examining and implementing the
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project on the other. Examining the project yields
λ− C −W + θh− µ
∗
2h
·
p + 1
2
(h+ µ∗)
¸
+(1− α) h− µ
∗
2h δV
EL
t+1 +
µ
1− (1− α) h− µ
∗
2h
¶
δV NEt+1
whereas not examining and always implementing yields
λ− C + θp+ (1− α)V ELt+1 + αV NEt+1
Therefore, a project will be examined if and only if
θh− µ
∗
2h
·
p+ 1
2
(h+ µ∗)
¸
− θp− (1− α) h+ µ
∗
2h
¡
V ELt+1 − V NEt+1
¢
≥W
Now we turn to the design decision. If no project is designed the expected payoff
equals λ+ V NEt+1 , and so a project will be designed if and only if
θh− µ
∗
2h
·
p+ 1
2
(h+ µ∗)
¸
+
h− µ∗
2h (1− α)
¡
V ELt+1 − V NEt+1
¢
≥W + C
By setting v as high as possible the electorate reduces the influence of re-election
concerns on the project implementation decision as much as possible. Setting v∗ =
p + h is therefore a best reply to the behaviour of the incumbent given that rule 2
is used. Q.E.D.
Theorem 1: This follows directly from lemma 2 and from the analysis in the text
in section 3.3. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5: The proof runs along lines similar to that of proposition
3. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6: This follows from the analysis in the text. Q.E.D.
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